Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) was signed in 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

The Ukrainian SSR, which was a co-drafting party to the BWC, signed it on 10 April 1972 and ratified it on 21 February 1975.

The Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition by any country of means for the use of biological or toxin weapons as a means of waging war.

States Parties to the Convention undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain: 1) biological agents or toxins of such types and in such quantities as are not intended for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed for the use of such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflicts. They also undertake not to transfer, or assist any State or international organisation in the production or acquisition of the aforementioned agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery.

A distinctive feature of the Convention is that it permits States Parties to possess small quantities of microbiological or other biological agents and toxins ‘for preventive, protective or other peaceful purposes’, as well as the absence of a verification mechanism that has been put into practice.

By a decision of the Ninth Review Conference of the Convention (28 November – 16 December 2022, Geneva), a Working Group on Strengthening the BWC Convention was established with the aim of addressing the following key tasks:

- development of mechanisms: developing and providing recommendations on mechanisms to strengthen the implementation of the Convention, in particular regarding international cooperation and assistance (ICA) and the review and assessment of scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention (S&T);

- promoting transparency and confidence-building: strengthening trust between States Parties by improving transparency mechanisms, including confidence-building measures and the fulfilment of reporting obligations;

- strengthening assistance, response and preparedness in accordance with Article VII of the BWC: improving global capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to the misuse of biological agents and toxins;

- improving measures for compliance with the regime established by the Convention and for verification: exploring approaches to enhance compliance with obligations under the Convention, whilst ensuring respect for the sovereignty of States and the conformity of verification measures with international standards;

- promoting the universalisation of the Convention: encouraging universal accession to the Convention by urging States that are not yet Parties to accede to it and to fully implement its provisions;

- encouraging multilateral cooperation: promoting international cooperation in the peaceful use of biological agents in accordance with Article X of the BWC, whilst ensuring that misuse is prevented.

Between 2023 and 2026, nine meetings of the Working Group were held under the Brazilian chairmanship. A further meeting of the Working Group is scheduled to take place in December 2026.

As a co-author and full party to the Convention, Ukraine supports the comprehensive strengthening of the BWC regime, in particular through the further universalisation of the Convention, the improvement of the confidence-building mechanism, and the enhancement of monitoring and assessment of developments in scientific research and biotechnology, expanding international cooperation with a view to the peaceful use of scientific and technological advances, ensuring the effective prevention, detection, diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases, as well as preventing and responding to the possible unlawful use of biological or toxin agents. Key areas of focus include strengthening cooperation, exchanging experience and information in the fields of biotechnology and biomedicine, and introducing educational programmes on biosafety and bioethics.

Ukraine does not possess any biological weapons of its own and is not engaged in work to develop them. However, there are medical, scientific and industrial institutions within our country that maintain banks of microorganisms falling within the scope of the Convention. Since 1992, Ukraine has annually provided the UN Secretariat with the necessary information on its implementation of the BWC as part of confidence-building measures.

As part of its efforts to justify its large-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022, Russia is conducting a disinformation campaign on the BWC platform, spreading false allegations that Ukraine is allegedly developing biological weapons with USA assistance. Such actions by the Russian Federation are aimed at undermining confidence in the regime established by the BWC, diverting the attention of the Parties to the Convention from the numerous war crimes committed by the aggressor state against the people of Ukraine, and concealing Russia’s activities in circumvention of the BWC. The groundlessness of the Russian allegations was confirmed during the Official Consultative Meeting, initiated by Russia in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention (2022), and during the Ninth Review Conference of the BWC (2022) and the meetings of the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention in 2023–2026, during which a clear consensus was reached that the Russian Federation is a destructive force which, by violating the Convention itself, is comprehensively undermining the regime of prohibition and non-proliferation of biological weapons.

Ukraine is keen to find effective ways of countering any future abuse of the Convention’s provisions, in order to safeguard its integrity and viability.

The devastating consequences of Russian aggression for the integrity of Ukraine’s biosafety and biosecurity systems have led to the Ukrainian side losing control over collections of microorganisms that were stored at relevant key facilities, now located in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. In this regard, Ukraine advocates for international monitoring of the Russian Federation’s compliance, as an occupying power, with its obligations under international humanitarian law in territories where the Ukrainian authorities are temporarily unable to exercise their powers.

During the meetings of the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention, the Ukrainian side also supports the need to ensure that the BWC operates in synergy with other international organisations, as well as the establishment of transparent mechanisms for reviewing scientific achievements relating to the peaceful use of biological agents and for preventing abuse, taking into account examples of successful mechanisms within the OPCW and the IAEA.

Ukraine uses the BWC platform, amongst other things, to call on foreign partners to continue exerting pressure on Russia in order to prevent it from using weapons of mass destruction to achieve its criminal objectives in Ukraine.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) is a multilateral instrument of international humanitarian law, which aims to overcome the consequences of indiscriminate and widespread use of these weapons in many regions of the world. To achieve the proclaimed goal one should totally ban and eliminate certain conventional weapons which are landmines (APL).

The Convention was opened for signature on December 3, 1997 and came into force on March 1, 1999. Ukraine signed the Convention 24.02.1999 and ratified it 18.05.2005.

Among the obligations foreseen by the Convention are the elimination of dumped stocks of anti-personnel mines (Article 4), ensuring “the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas” (Article 5).

The Convention provides for the readiness of States Parties, the United Nations, regional and non-governmental organizations to provide financial, logistical and other assistance to achieve these goals. Such assistance may be channeled, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international regional organizations and institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations and on a bilateral basis.

During the Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention (November 24, 2023), a decision was approved to extend Ukraine’s obligations under Article 5 of the Convention to destroy anti-personnel mines in mined areas for ten years, which was a recognition by the international community of the unprecedented scale of contamination of Ukraine’s territory with mines and other explosive devices as a result of the ongoing full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation. In addition, the decision of the parties also confirmed that the ongoing war by Russia

(which is not a party to the Ottawa Convention) is the main obstacle to Ukraine’s implementation of its obligations under the Convention.

On November 25-29, 2024, the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention was held in Cambodia, which identified the main areas of work in the areas of demining, destruction of anti-personnel mines and assistance to victims for the next five years.

During the first half of 2025, in view of the decisions of the Baltic countries, Poland and Finland to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, Ukraine monitored and analyzed the progress of domestic procedures related to the process of their withdrawal in order to duly take these trends into account in the formation of Ukraine's foreign policy.

In July 2025, the Law of Ukraine No. 4519-ІХ of 15.07.2025 on the suspension of the Ottawa Convention for Ukraine was adopted. In this regard, the President of the 22nd Meeting of the States Parties and the Committee on Cooperative Compliance with the Convention were informed of the official position of our state, emphasizing that the adopted political decision is a reaction to a fundamental change in the security environment as a result of the ongoing aggression of the Russian Federation; Ukraine's decision is a defensive and legitimate step in response to an existential threat and is aimed exclusively at protecting the population from war crimes; Ukraine confirms its full commitment to the norms of international humanitarian law, taking into account the requirements for the protection of the civilian population.

On July 18, 2025, Ukraine submitted a communication to the UN Secretary-General on the decision to suspend the operation of the Ottawa Convention, referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), is one of the most important documents in international humanitarian law governing the methods and means of warfare.

The CCW was adopted at the UN Conference, held in Geneva in September 1979 and in September-October 1980. It was opened for signature in New York on April 10, 1981.

Ukraine ratified the CCW on June 23, 1982.

In addition to the Convention, three Additional Protocols to it were adopted during the Conference: Protocol I – ‘On Non-Detectable Fragments’, Protocol II – ‘On Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices’, and Protocol III – ‘On Incendiary Weapons’.

The main aim of the provisions enshrined in the Convention is to protect the civilian population and combatants from excessive injury or unjustified suffering resulting from the use of specific types of conventional weapons.

The Convention is a framework document that provides for the adoption of additional protocols, which include specific standards of the conventional rules on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of weapons that may have indiscriminate effects and cause unnecessary suffering to civilian

population and combatants in situations of armed conflict. For example, Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons intended for shrapnel impression that can not be detected in the human body by X-rays.

Due to the necessity of further implementation of the prohibitions and restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons the First Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW approved the Additional Protocol IV «On blinding laser weapons» (October 13, 1995.). This protocol is considered as a preventive measure against the threat of the use of laser technology as a weapon for infliction of direct damage to the personnel of armed forces. Protocol IV entered into force on July 30, 1998.

In addition, on May 3, 1996 the First Review Conference adopted amendments to the Protocol II «On Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices». The main content of the amendments is as follows:

· the provisions of the Protocol is applicable not only to international armed conflicts, but also to non-international armed conflicts (as defined in 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 1949);

· prohibition of the use of anti-personnel landmines not detectable by commonly means;

· all remotely delivered APLs have to be equipped with mechanisms of self-destruction and self-deactivation;

· рarties bear responsibility for the minefields, mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas under their control, and undertake to eliminate them after the end of active hostilities;

· рarties undertake not to transfer APLs to States not bound by this Protocol.

Amended Protocol II entered into force on 3 December 1998.

The Second Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW (2001) approved an amendment to Article 1 of the Convention, which extends the scope of the Convention and of all its Protocols over non-international armed conflicts.

In November 2003, the Annual meeting of States Parties to the CCW approved Protocol V «On explosive remnants of war», which came into force on November 12, 2006.

In accordance with the decision of the First Review Conference of the CCW, Review Conferences are convened every five years to address issues of implementation and scope of use of the Convention and its protocols. Meeting of States Parties to the Convention and its Protocols, as well as meeting of experts are held annually. The next Review Conference of the CCW will be held in November 2026.

Ukraine is a State Party to the CCW and all applicable Protocols, including an amendment to Article I of the CCW.

Our state regularly submits national annual reports on compliance with the provisions of the Convention and its protocols, and also fully fulfills its obligations under the above-mentioned documents.

In the context of the ongoing armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine using weapons prohibited by the Convention, one of the priority tasks for our state within the framework of the Convention remains to hold Russia accountable for violating the provisions of the Convention and its Protocols to draw the international community’s attention to the need to implement a wide range of measures to clear areas of Ukraine contaminated with explosive ordnance, and to secure the necessary international technical and financial assistance to achieve these objectives.